|Part of a Comparisons series|
Comparisons is a collection of Cognitive Typology articles developed to describe the specific relationship CT theory has to other psychological theories. The degree of parity that CT has to any adjacent theory is specific to each individual theory and what that theory's definitions are for each of its terms. The following article contains a growing list of comparisons to various theories.
The Nature of Comparison
The CT theory hold that whether two objects, including itself and another theory, are the same or different, is an matter decided by an ontological bias. At the limit, the ontological bias of N (continuous) holds that all things can and do intersect, and therefore share a fundamental same-ness at root as one object. The ontological bias of S (discrete), at its limit, holds that all things, however similar, are always in some way different, and this difference qualifies objects as being discrete and not the same. This creates a typological bias problem in how to define the relationship between CT and other theories it intersects with. This problem is addressed in the following manner:
From the discrete (S) perspective, the CT theory treats itself in isolation as being distinct from any other model. No matter how similar CT's descriptions might appear on the surface to other Jungian theories, even slight differences in typing methodology lead to far reaching differences in the classification of types, in the definition of selfhood and in the application of psychodynamics. This is especially important to consider from a clinical perspective, where proper diagnosis is critical. The CT theory holds that no other model carries the same classification methodology as CT, measured through the codifier tool, and therefore type classification is non-identical to any other Jungian interpretation and must be treated separately. Therefore, CT's "NeFi" is non-identical to Myers-Brigg's ENFP, nor to Socionic's IEE or other terms.
From the continuous (N) perspective, the CT theory is a subset of Jungian typology, sharing in its fundamental structure through the application of ideas such as: J-P duality, T-F duality, N-S duality, Je-Ji-Pe-Pi functions, conscious-unconscious function relationships and function hierarchy. No matter how these ideas are defined by various models, all theories with an isomorphic structure to Jung's original framework are classified as Jungian, and belong to the same investigative tradition. Therefore, CT retains continuity with the Jungian tradition and is speaking about the same theoretical framework.
Integration between these two views (discrete & continuous) is achieved by considering each perspective to exist at a different, but complementary, level of resolution. The continuous (N) view exists at a macroscopic scale while the discrete (S) view exists at a microscopic scale. Just as we might say that a Poodle is not a Shih Tzu at a very microscopic level of resolution, while saying that Poodle's and Shih Tzu's are both dogs at a broader level of resolution, the same applies to CT. At the sharpest level of resolution, it is distinct from any other model and is not saying the same thing as any other model when it uses its type classifications. However, from a wider perspective, it belongs to the same tradition and has various degrees of parity with each Jungian variant theory.
The Cognitive Typology Architecture has moderate parity with the SOAR architecture, sharing similarities between three out of four modules: procedural processing (SOAR: procedural memory), definitional processing (SOAR: semantic memory), temporal contextualizing (SOAR: episodic memory). The two architectures also share an interface with the external world through two gateways, information gathering (SOAR: perception) and pass to the motor system (SOAR: action).
The Cognitive Typology model has low parity with Humorism, but only at the behavioral level between P+ (Sanguine), P- (Phlegmatic), J- (Melancholic) and J+ (Choleric).